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The concept of Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) programs have
been widely utilized throughout the aviation industry. The premise behind the
concept is to establish thresholds for flight situations based upon company
operations specifications, regulatory guidance, aircraft limitations, and standard
operating procedures and then monitor performance on the aggregate to determine
if operations fall within acceptable boundaries. A singular exceedance may not
trigger corrective actions, but if overall exceedances for the company exceed a
predetermined acceptable threshold then mitigation strategies are employed to
bring performance back within acceptable limits. Does this tell the whole story?
Would allowing feedback for performance against idealistic targets be a better
method for safety improvements? This paper will discuss the dynamics of
investigative analysis of a project for stability of an approach and discuss the pros
and cons of using systems that traditionally measure aggregate performance
versus a system that determines degrees of performance.
FOQA Programs
The concept of a Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) program has roots in
previous quantitative and qualitative aviation recording programs such as flight data recorders
(FDRs), the Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP), and the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting
System. As indicated by program success at the airline level, a FOQA program should be
accompanied by safety management systems (SMS) and a sound safety culture (Wiley 2007;
FAA, 2006b). Airlines have realized much success from FOQA programs, and there have been
recent efforts to bridge that success into the General Aviation sector, and despite the efforts of
the FAA to expand FOQA, only 17% of smaller air operators have adopted it (Accardi, 2013).
FOQA is a significantly different program than all previous safety programs discussed.
Unlike the ASRS and FAA Aviation Safety Action Programs (ASAPs), FOQA uses quantitative,
objective data from flights to enhance trend monitoring and address operational risk issues
(FAA, 2004; FSF, 1998). These operational risk issues, as discovered by FOQA data can lead to
the development of more specific training programs such as Advanced Qualification Programs
(AQPs). Historically only those on the flight deck during the flight know the true events of a
given flight in relation to the flight data parameters collected. However, with the increased
accessibility of FOQA type data across operations of all sizes, the aviation industry is still
determining the best way to understand and utilize this rich data source.

The first workshop attempting to identify the benefits, utilization, and to encourage
adoption worldwide of FOQA programs was by the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) in Taiwan in
1989 (FSF, 1998). According to the Foundation (1998), their blueprint for FOQA has been the
backbone for FOQA progress in the United States. However, this was only a starting point and
there is potentially more work to be done in order to completely understand its full potential.
The FAA took initiative to develop a formal FOQA program in 1990 by hosting a FSF workshop
in Washington, DC, and in 2001 developed a rulemaking committee to further work in this area
(FAA, 2003; FSF, 1998).
Before FOQA received full support from the FAA, a demonstration project was carried
out to assess the costs, benefits, and safety enhancement associated with the program (FSF,
1998). During this project, the FAA provided hardware and software to four airlines which
agreed to implement FOQA programs and share data with the FAA. As a result of the success of
the project, the FAA determined that FOQA programs would be made voluntary as data
collection and use for advanced FOQA programs were still in primitive form. The project
demonstrated that the FOQA concept was a success for airlines by allowing enhanced trend
monitoring and the identification of operational risks (FSF, 1998). The FAA did not attempt to
create a FOQA program for non-commercial use during their three year demonstration project
(FSF, 1998), although it is possible that a FOQA program for the general aviation sector would
improve safety and operational performance in addition to assisting in flight training (Mitchell,
Sholy, & Stolzer, 2007).
For those flight operations that plan to begin a FOQA program, a program development
guideline is available in Advisory Circular 120-82, which discusses the benefits, set up, and
maintenance of FOQA programs (FAA, 2004). This document also provides a template for the
Implementation and Operations (I & O) plan set-up as well as key definitions that must be
addressed during program establishment (FAA, 2004)
Airline officials, pilot union representatives and the FAA recognized that data protection
issues were the biggest roadblock for FOQA program implementation (FSF, 1998). Initially,
pilot unions were reluctant to sign FOQA agreements with airlines as they feared a lack of
protection for collected FOQA data. FSF (1998) highlights three concerns airline pilot unions
had with program implementation:
“[first,] that the information may be used in enforcement/discipline actions; [second,] that
such data in the possession of the federal government may be obtained by the public and
the media through the provisions of FOIA; and [third] that the information may be
obtained in civil litigation through the discovery process” (FSF, 1998, p. 7).
To address these concerns, 14 CFR Part 13 Section 13.401 was created. This document
mandates FOQA data be stripped of any information that may identify the submitting airline
before the data is passed to the FAA (FAA, 2004). The FAA ensures that “aggregate data that is
provided to the FAA will be kept confidential and the identity of reporting pilots or airlines will
remain anonymous as allowed by law” (FAA, 2004, p. 1). It is believed that relatively little
exposure or experience with FOQA programs in any context will directly impact the perceptions
of the individual within the flight program utilizing FOQA.

Traditional FOQA Data Analysis
With the data analysis focus of FOQA operations geared toward aggregate data, the
natural inclination is to capture outliers from the normal operations rather than an analysis of the
data to determine degrees of performance from a pre-determined objective. In a traditional
FOQA program the system is set up with thresholds of measurements based upon one or more
measures. For approach stability access these measures could be airspeed, vertical speed, roll
rate, pitch rate, g-forces, or a combination of individual measures and the flight path angle. It is
common for a FOQA program to establish “gates” along an approach flight path where flight
parameters and aircraft configuration have to be within predetermined thresholds or a missed
approach/go-around is warranted. If the aircraft goes beyond the boundaries of the flight path
angle or exceeds the limits at an individual gate then an exceedance is recorded. The
organization then follows up with a mitigation strategy to reduce the number of exceedances and
continues to monitor the trends within the system. Of course, part of this understanding includes
clarifying more contextually specific details that might offer a better interpretation of why these
exceedances occurred. Upon looking at Figure 1a and 1b the framework of this system can be
seen in a representation for approaches to an example runway. Looking at the blue line that
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Figure 1b. FPA Analysis
represents the flight path it can be seen that Figure 1a stays relatively close to the center line and

Figure 1b varies along the flight path but never exceeds the outer boundaries. If the aircraft had
met the criteria at the given “gates” then the FOQA system might not have recorded either
approach as an exceedance even though the aircraft in Figure 1a could be considered more
stable.
Alternative FOQA Data Analysis
Because of the aforementioned limitations to a more strictly exceedance based approach,
an alternative method for FOQA approach analysis is to measure the Flight Path Angle (FPA) at
1 second intervals along the approach, calculate the absolute value of the difference between a
given second and its subsequent second value, and then the sum of the variations in the FPAs for
the last 30 seconds could be calculated. An approach that maintained a perfectly consistent FPA
would have no difference in the FPAs at each second interval and then the sum of the variations
in the FPAs for the last 30 seconds would equal zero. An approach that had a lot of variation
would end up with a larger sum of the variation in the FPAs for the last 30 seconds. It is this
measure that could then be used to determine the stability of an approach path. Therefore, this
technique will give an overall dynamic view of an approach trend, rather than a measure of FPA
boundaries. Aircraft that exhibit high variations in FPA will be considered less stable and will
warrant further review just as the approaches that trigger an exceedance require further inquiry.
This type of analysis also allows comparisons of all approaches, and can identify trends for
operational improvements.
A system similar to the one described above was developed at the NASA Ames Research
Center is the Aviation Performance Measuring System (APMS) (Chidester, 2003). According to
Chidester (2003), the mission of APMS has three major thrusts; moving beyond exceedancedetection to routine analysis of all the data, providing focused analysis of higher risk phases of
flight, and mining the data for atypical, potential precursors of incidents and accidents. The
major movement from APMS is a shift from waiting until an aircraft operates outside of
established parameters (exceedance) and recording it, seeing if there is a trend in recorded
exceedances, and then identifying if it’s a systemic problem in the operation or isolated to a
given airport or aircraft. The system works by analyzing data and grouping operations into
“normal” and “outliers”. If the preponderance of operations to a given airport all look the same
it is assumed that the operation is normal and therefore safe. If an operation is grouped outside
of the typical performance parameter then it is flagged for follow-up by an aviation safety
professional. This prevents needless oversight and focuses efforts to the operations that have a
higher likelihood of needing analysis. In 2004 APMS was put to into action and was able to take
more than 16,000 flights over a two year period and narrow it down to the most statistically
extreme 5% of the dataset (Chidester, 2004). These flights were further analyzed and it was
found that they fell into 8 different categories; high-energy arrivals, turbulence and
accommodation, go-arounds, landing rollout anomalies, atypical climbs, takeoff anomalies,
TCAS resolution advisories with escape maneuvers, unusual arrival paths (Chidester, 2004).
This is a significant step forward in data analysis for FOQA efforts but there is still room for
improvement. Of the 95% of the flights that fell into the “normal” operation category there is
still variability from the target or ideal operation. Even though the parameters evaluated in the
APMS system tend to fall around the mean for each parameter, the approaches conducted are
still measured at “gates” or intervals at 1500, 1000, 500, and 100 feet above the runway

(Chidester, 2003). By measuring the change in performance at subsequent intervals the
variability or change in performance can be determined which could be a better indicator of
operational stability for certain types of procedures.
Conclusion
FOQA programs continue to evolve and are becoming more robust as the technology
affords opportunities to analyze data in different ways. A significant barrier to consider moving
past traditional FOQA analysis is the desire to group flight operations into a binary mode.
“Stable” versus “unstable” categorizations or “normal” versus “extreme” can be replaced by
measurements from targeted objectives. It will be necessary to avoid the temptation to label
operations that fall within a “stable” category but are determined to have room for improvement
to be considered “unstable”. The focus of every professional pilot should be to want to improve
their performance beyond what has already been achieved. Professionals should also want to
identify when their performance deviates from the target beyond what they normally achieve.
The individual performance may still be considered acceptable and within normal parameters,
but these types of evaluations can assist pilots in determining reasons for why their performance
is decreasing. Hindrances to performance such as fatigue, recency of experience, aircraft
familiarity, and environmental conditions could all be qualified as to how they affect a particular
pilot from their target objective. These types of measurements could provide robust feedback as
a step toward process improvement.
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